Thomas Glahn and Johan Nagel: Towards the abyss of life's tragic indeterminacy by Kruszelnicki, Michał
 123 
THOMAS GLAHN AND JOHAN 
NAGEL: TOWARDS THE ABYSS OF 





Introduction: Pan and Mysteries: modernist roots? 
Hamsun’s early novels, Pan and Mysteries, most fully realize the 
basic tenets of his critical program outlined in Paa Turné1. The 
principal aim of Hamsun’s lectures was to turn the Norwegian 
literature from realism/naturalism into the path of a deeper 
psychology of an individual as seen by the writer depicting the 
manifold shades of its psyche. In an unprecedented way the two 
mentioned novels posit a human being as an incomprehensible and 
unpredictable mystery. Both the creation of the protagonist as an 
individual extremely chaotic in thinking and acting and the 
narration of the two stories served to discredit the traditional 
model of depicting man as a rational being whose acts have 
particular reasons and aims. 
 The model of a protagonist filled with ambiguities and 
inconsistencies, alienated from the society, torn apart between his 
private life and the demands of the public sphere remains virtually 
“modernist”, if one agrees to regard literary modernism as an 
aesthetic and intellectual objection to the ideal of a bourgeois 
society built upon an enlightened, “humanistic” belief in human’s 
rationality and benevolence and his ability to set moral order and 
political welfare by way of a rational interaction of individuals 
aptly and eagerly finding their place in the society.   
                                                 
1 See: K. Hamsun, Paa turnée. Tre foredrag om literatur ved Knut 
Hamsun, utgitt av T. Hamsun, Gyldendal, Oslo 1971. 
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It has rightly been argued that “modernism is not only, not even 
primarily, a formal movement; it is also a change in the mind”1. At 
a time of the positivist belief in „pure facts” and in physical 
sciences’ omnipotence it was literature that responded to this new 
cultural reality by way of launching a project of a radical psycho-
logization of the individual, who, all of a sudden, has ceased to 
reflect typical for a given social class modes of thinking and acting 
and came to be not so much the product of social relations, but 
more of a half-conscious spokesman for his own erratic and 
unpredictable psyche.  
 It is in this historical and literary context that some critics, 
most notably Martin Humpàl2, regard Hamsun’s literary program 
along with its subsequent realizations: Hunger, Pan and 
Mysteries. Indeed, in the late nineteenth century the idea of 
renouncing the notions of “type” and “character” was known to 
many writers; August Strindberg, for instance, attacked it directly 
in his preface to Miss Julie (1888) and Fyodor Dostoyevski was 
suspicious about it in his Notes from the Underground (1864). 
 It could be argued, then, that young Hamsun was not 
particularly original with his idea of a new psychology of the 
protagonist and a new mode of narration. Both of these tenets can 
be found among other prominent modernist writers, notably in the 
works of Hamsun’s own teachers: Nietzsche, Dostoyevski and 
Strindberg. One can have an impression that what Hamsun 
actually did, was only to raise the observed tendencies of the late 
modernism to their extreme.  
                                                 
1 L. Gustaffson, Strindberg as a Forerunner of Scandinavian Modernism 
[in:] The Hero on Scandinavian Literature. From Peer Gynt to the 
Present, Ed. J. M. Weinstock and R.T. Rovitsky, University of Texas 
Press, Austin/London 1975, p. 131. 
2 M. Humpàl, The Roots of Modernist Narrative: Knut Hamsun’s Novels: 
Hunger, Mysteries, and Pan, Solum Forlag, Oslo 1998. A quick survey of 
essential works situating Hamsun’s 90’ authorship in the context of the 
European modernism can be found in Ståle Dingstad’s study: Hamsuns 
strategier. Realisme, humor og kynisme, Gyldendal, Oslo 2003, p. 35-37. 
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Contrary to this conclusion, however, in my paper I will argue that 
Pan’s and Mysteries’ protagonists represent a new and 
extraordinary, albeit full of ambiguities, image of man, quite 
different even from the most shockingly bizarre individuals 
populating the literature of modernism. 
 
1. Hamsun’s modernist specificity: a new psychology of an 
individual 
In order to better grasp the specificity of the Hamsunian image of 
a human being, one should look closer at the psychological 
dynamic of some other heroes of the modernist prose, and then try 
to compare them with creations of Nagel and Glahn. The 
protagonists of the classic works of the nineteenth century are 
possessive of an extremely rich and complex inner life, constantly 
acknowledging the transitive character of their own identity and 
seeking their place in the world. What can always be said about 
these individuals, however, is that they are always in one way or 
another bearers of some general or universal traits of personality 
encouraging the reader to identify them with one concrete idea, 
such and such existential situation, such and such problem, or, 
briefly speaking, one particular aspect of humanity.  
 Let us recall a few examples from the psychological literature 
so that we can grasp the general tendency which seems to govern 
it. Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary and Leo Tolstoï’s Anna 
Karenina represent mainly the solitude of an artistic, erotically 
unfulfilled nature in an alien world of social convenances. In 
Joseph Conrad’s novels we deal with individuals who pay a price 
of exasperating guilt for their impulsive decisions, the feeling 
being lifted only through a confrontation with the past and their 
own consciousness. Romain Rolland’s Jean-Christophe, as well as 
Mabel from Virginia Woolf’s short story The New Dress and 
Clyde from Theodore Dreiser’s The American Tragedy all 
represent a phenomenon of social and economic pressures that 
shape people’s life and the decried loss of sovereignty in the 
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necessity of conforming to the artificial demands of the leading 
group, its fashion and behavior. In David Herbert Lawrence’s Sons 
and Lovers the protagonist Paul stands for the idea of im-
possibility of the relationship between man and woman because of 
the former’s emotional fixation on his own mother. This theme is 
often used also by Guy de Maupassant. Kafka’s prose shows the 
lack of orientation and the feeling of life’s absurdity (Trans-
formation, The Trial) revealed to humans especially in the 
moments when they are trying to find in it any goal whatsoever 
(The Castle). Proust – and let it be our last example – embarks on 
a nostalgic journey of memory to „regain the time lost” by way of 
scrupulous tracing of tiniest sensations, which all of a sudden may 
recapture the images of a distant past.     
 The protagonists of these works are way out of the league of 
mundane “types” and “characters” so ironically ridiculed by 
Hamsun in his attacks on the popular patterns of realism. And yet, 
albeit their refinement as psychological creations, one cannot 
escape the impression that these personas always represent some 
clearly determined dimensions of human existence more than they 
represent the others. 
 Now, what can we say for sure about Hamsun’s heroes: 
Glahn and Nagel? Here we meet a dilemma, since no aspect of 
their personalities comes to the fore. If they undertake an action, 
the only rule that governs it is a sudden, impulsive, half-conscious 
decision made generally in the most extraordinary circumstances. 
Of course, critics have come up with a great deal of inter-
pretations, trying to indicate some dominant features in these two 
characters. Hanna Larsen, for instance, regards Nagel as a 
philanthropist1, while Johan Borgen reads Mysteries – the first 
four chapters of the novel being most important to him – as a story 
                                                 
1 H. A. Larsen, Knut Hamsun, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1922, p. 49. 
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about artist’s creative life and his eventual doom1. In Rolf N. 
Nettum’s highly influential study Nagel appears as the advocate of 
a mystical doctrine, the teacher of a pantheistic belief in the great 
unity of the universe, which he desperately tries to communicate2. 
All such readings are valid, by they bring forth but one aspect of 
Nagel’s personality. I think Øystein Rottem and James McFarlane 
are much closer to the truth when they stress the chronic 
inconsistency in Nagels’ thinking and acting. McFarlane writes 
that Nagel – being himself a thorough observer of other people’s 
ways – does not allow them to enter his inner world by way of 
constant buffooneries and mystifications3. In this sense Nagel has 
certainly a core, a personality, if you will, but we do not know it, 
simply because he does not want us to know. According to 
Rottem: “Nagel is a master of disguise, a man who feigns (for-
stiller seg), and plays roles. There is no ‘real’ Nagel and it would 
be a pointless task for a reader to try to (re)construct a figure 
thought in this way”4. Insightful as McFarlane’s and Rottem’s 
thesis may be, I personally do not believe Nagel to be reflexive 
enough to be able to consciously trick other people. For my 
                                                 
1 “Allerede disse første 40 sidene sier oss med all tydelighet at Mysterier 
er en roman om en kunstner. Noe mer: om en kunstner i unnfangelsens 
stund, eller i underganges stund” – J. Borgen, Nagel [in:] Ø. Rottem (ed.) 
Søkelys på Knut Hamsun’s 90-års diktning, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 
1979, p. 111.  
2 R. N. Nettum, Konflikt og visjon. Hovedtemaer i Knut Hamsuns 
forfatterskap 1890-1912, Gyldendal, Oslo 1970, p. 121-128. Nettum 
regards Nagel’s sojurn in the forest and the mystical dream about “sailing 
in the skies’ ocean, fishing with the silver rod” as his “central experience” 
(sentrale opplevelse) and a key to explain his strange behaviors – ibidem, 
p. 122, 127.   
3 J. W. McFarlane, The Whisper of Blood. The Study of Knut Hamsun’s 
Early Novels, “PMLA” 1956, vol. 71, nr  4, p. 572 n. 
4 „Nagel er en maskeringskunstner, en mann som forstiller seg og spiller 
roller. Det fins ingen ‘egentlig’ Nagel, og for en fortolker ville det være 
nytteløs gjerning å forsøke å (re)konstruere en slik tenkt figur” – Ø. 
Rottem, Hamsun og fantasiens triumph, Gyldendal, Oslo 2002, p. 85. 
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understanding of this protagonist it is in Humpàl’s and Kittang’s 
discussion with Nettum that the most vital observations have been 
made. According to Kittang, Nagel’s “naturerotiske ekstase” does 
not determine his “true identity” but shows “a tension between 
identity and estrangement, fullness and lack, the harmonic part of 
his Ego and the aggressive, self-destructive one, between Eros and 
Death”1. I finally agree with Humpàl’s view of Nagel as a figure 
presented in such a contradictory way, that it is not clear what 
kind of message he wants to carry across2.  
 The specificity of Nagel’s and Glahn’s personas seems to lie 
in the fact they themselves do not know who they really are 
(Kittang: “a tension between identity and estrangement”). They 
can spend hours following strange thoughts that wander their 
minds, trying hopelessly to figure out why exactly they acted this 
way rather then another. Of course in vain would they wait for an 
answer to these questions. In certain moments, however, Glahn’s 
thoughts betray that he is at the same time far and close from 
deciphering the riddle of his inconsistent deeds: “Why? Ask the 
twelve months and ships in the sea, ask the mysterious god of your 
heart…”3. My next task will be to shed some light on these 
puzzling words. 
 
2. Beyond Dostoyevski and Strindberg 
I shall now contrast Hamsun’s creations with those of his two 
prominent masters: Dostoyevski and Strindberg. Dostoyevski 
congenially portrayed the antinomies that tear apart a human 
                                                 
1 “spenninga mellom identitet og framandgjering, fylde og mangel, 
harmonisk Eg-kjensle og aggressiv Eg-oppløysing, Eros og Død” – A. 
Kittang, Luft, vind, ingenting. Hamsuns desillusjonsromanar frå Sult til 
Ringen Sluttet, Gyldendal, Oslo 1984, p. 91. 
2 M. Humpàl, op. cit., p. 78. 
3 K. Hamsun, Pan [in:] K. Hamsun, Samlede Verker, vol. 2, Gylendal, 
Oslo 1992, p. 404. English translation: K. Hamsun, Pan, trans. Sverre 
Lyngstad, Penguin Books, New York 1998, p. 100. 
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being. Even his Alosha Karamazov, the embodiment of Russian 
orthodox purity, can abandon his deep faith in a second and go to 
a brothel with Rakitin. However, in each of such cases, be it 
Raskolnikov, Ivan Karamazov or Stavrogin, one can observe one 
tendency: after performing a gesture unacceptable within a society 
and sinful from the point of view of Christian religion, the 
protagonists of Dostoyevski undergo an inner struggle, feel 
remorse, reconsider their action prospectively or retrospectively. It 
thus might be said that they always feel some kind of a 
fundamental responsibility for the world or the society, against 
which they tried to raise in a gesture of blasphemy, negation or 
transgression. 
 Now, turning back to Nagel and Glahn, one is led to conclude 
they never feel the afore-mentioned responsibility, nor do they 
have any kind of remorse as a result of their reckless, or 
sometimes ruthless, ways. Naturally, after a series of bizarre faux-
pas in his encounters with other people from Sirilund, Glahn feels 
the need to escape back to the woods, where he notices that his 
“befriended” stone placed in front of his cottage “stands with an 
expression of pain and despair”. Such an emotion of shame is not 
meant to last long, however, maybe a few seconds. It is soon 
replaced by a different emotion which might suddenly guide 
Glahn’s thoughts and actions toward a completely different, if not 
opposite, direction. When it comes to more serious offences, such 
as humiliating people close to him, as it happens in his relation 
with the doctor, he performs his erratic deeds as if in a dream. 
Spitting in the baron’s ear or shooting his beloved dog, Ezop does 
not provoke in him any kind of repentance or grief. What is per-
haps most shocking, is Glahn’s behavior after he unintentionally 
kills his lover, Eva, in a stone avalanche he himself triggered. 
Thinking of Eva over her grave, Glahn bids his lover farewell with 
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a shockingly egoistic confession about another woman, who is 
now “possessing all his thoughts”1.  
 It seems then that Glahn and Nagel respond to the 
surrounding world non-reflexively and automatically, letting them-
selves be momentarily driven by their senses’ desires, imagination, 
or by vague fantasms generated by their psyche. Characteristic of 
them are sudden and hardly understandable changes of mood. 
Nagel, for instance, experiences a suicidal grief after his last 
conversation with Minute, only to let himself be lifted by a joyful 
exaltation one moment later, making him cry of happiness and 
give money to the children in the street. The moral sphere of the 
two protagonists seems in this regard largely reduced. Governed 
by no rule, respecting no value, no ideal, not even the most basic 
code of behavior, their morality amounts literarily to nothing more 
than flights of fancy, vibrant sensuality or irrational impulses what 
makes of it a perverted morality, morality à rebours immanent to a 
person completely egocentric, irresponsible – virtually anti-social.  
 But is it not Dostoyevski who first discovered the “man from 
the underground” – an absolute egoist who utters famous words 
that “the world can go to hell, as long as I can always have my 
tea”? Was it not Dostoyevski who portrayed in The Devils the 
suicidal character of Kirylov – an individual whose abnegation 
breaks even with the responsibility for himself and with an 
inherently human instinct of self-preservation? Indeed, “the man 
from the underground” renounces responsibility for the world. 
This negation however – as is also the case with other notorious 
protagonists of late modernism, duke Des Esseintes’a in 
Huysmans’s À rebours being one of the finest examples – is 
followed by an apotheosis of an egoistic “I” which becomes the 
proper subject of the individual’s concern. Therefore it can be 
argued that all in all “the man from the underground” does abide 
by a rule (his sole commandment being: “care only for thyself”), 
                                                 
1 Ibidem. 
 131 
does find in his life an Archimedean point he believes in. And 
speaking of Kirylov, let us not forget that his suicide would have 
been sublime as a glorious act of self-annihilation, had it not been 
for the fact that he decides to take his own life only to prove the 
non-existence of God. What dictates his deeds is in fact 
resentment. It is easy to notice the dialectic dependence of the 
hero on the world which he is trying to negate.  
 Beside discarding the world of others, Hamsun’s protagonists 
do not seem to acknowledge even the value of their own lives. 
Glahn can for no particular reason shoot himself in the leg or, after 
definitely leaving Edvarda, go for sure death with a smile, which 
even at that moment was, as Hamsun puts it, “beautiful”. Let us 
also recall the protagonist of Hunger, who despite his extreme 
poverty, risking massive sufferings or life, can give his last money 
to strangers met in the street. And finally Nagel who carries a 
bottle with poison to use it at any moment. It has rightly been 
observed that in Nagel there is “a great lassitude, an indifference, 
to his own advancement in life (…). He seems to have no purpose 
of any kind”1. This remark fits Glahn as well. Glahn and Nagel are 
like leaves floating freely in the air, swept from place to place 
without any purpose. The specificity of their existence could also 
be expressed by a comparison to a dreamscape, in which one 
vainly looks for sense and rational connections between sequences 
of events.    
 We would not do justice to Dostoyevski, however, if we did 
not consider here the figure of Smierdiakow, the fourth of the 
Karamazov brothers (although unaccepted by the family), one of 
the most terrifying characters ever created by the Russian writer. 
In his total irresponsibility for the world, the others and for 
himself he overbids even the most ruthless Hamsunian creations. I 
would risk a statement that it is Smierdiakov who remains the 
authentic literary ancestor of Glahn and Nagel, although contrary 
                                                 
1 H.A. Larsen, op. cit., p. 49. 
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to Hamsunian heroes he induces in readers an immediate feeling 
of dislike.  
 Similarly to these two characters, Smierdiakov plays out a 
bewildering character about whom  no-one knows anything for 
sure. It is someone for whom it is virtually neutral whether he 
helps or kills somebody, whether he takes his own life or not. Why 
did Smierdiakov kill? Because he wanted to. Because he took a 
sudden liking in Ivan’s quasi-Nietzschean philosophy. Ivan was 
only making a philosophical and psychological experiment, being 
far from actual perpetrating it. For Smierdiakov thinking and 
doing is the same thing. Now, why did he commit a suicide? 
Because he felt like. Certainly not because of bad consciousness 
and remorse – that was Ivan’s domain. This is why the police will 
have found by his body a short, sinister note which read: “I, 
myself. Do not blame anyone”. 
 One is led to conclude that Smierdiakov’s deeds do not 
originate from his moral evil or corruption, he is not merely a 
negative hero of the novel. He killed, but we can as well imagine 
him not having killed. And this, exactly, is the most terrifying 
feature of this character. He impersonates the pure chaos of being, 
the madness of the world and something that I call “life’s tragic 
indeterminacy” and by this concept I mean all the events, 
decisions and dictations of fate that horrify us because we cannot 
justify them and find in them any sense whatsoever. Now, I want 
to remind that although Dostoyevski created Smierdiakow – a 
predecessor of Glahn and Nagel – it was Hamsun who developed 
and thematized the phenomenon of an absolute inconsistency, 
read: total irresponsibility as a protagonist’s response to life’s 
immanent accidentality and indeterminacy. We shall return to this 
problem in a minute. 
 But before we do, we should shortly examine Strindberg’s 
case. There exists a substantial difference between the Hamsunian 
and Strindbergian approach to creating protagonists devoid of 
“character”. Already in his earliest novels Strindberg thought 
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about a “character” as a synonym for roles that an individual takes 
in social life1. It seems, then, that in Strindberg, who, being also a 
playwright, was extremely sensitive to the difference between 
authenticity and simulation, the concept of “character” served first 
of all the critique of the hypocritical society, which petrifies the 
individual by forcing it to identify with an externally imposed 
social role. According to Strindberg’s famous statement from The 
Son of the Servant: “character and automaton seem roughly to 
coincide”2. 
 Strindberg believed there is no such thing as a permanent 
“character”; there are only “characters” – always complex and 
contradictory. Still, if he were to choose either to become a fixed, 
unified character, or be torn apart between many versions of 
oneself, Strindberg would sympathize with the latter model. I 
believe he proves it in The Son of the Servant – the auto-
biographical work which introduces Johan, the capricious and 
always undecided outsider, unhappy because of his constant 
hesitations. On the last pages of the novel, however, Strindberg 
makes his protagonist feel satisfaction from this tormenting lack of 
consistency. As Johannesson comments: “Not having found a role 
for himself, Johan remains fully sincere. The lack of character, 
‘characterlessness’, as Strindberg calls it, is thus actually a virtue, 
and a distinct mark of superiority”3. 
 In Strindberg the combat with the notion of character was 
based on sociological observations. From the discovery that a 
constant character enslaves man, whereas its lack opens him to an 
infinite self-creation emerges some kind of philosophical 
                                                 
1 See: E.O. Johannesson, The Novels of August Strindberg. A Study in 
Theme and Structure, University of California Press, Berkeley/Los 
Angeles 1968, p. 17. 
2 “Karaktär och automat tyckas något så när sammanfalla” – A. 
Strindberg, Tjänstekvinnans son [in:] A. Strindberg, Samlade Skrifter, ed. 
John Landquist, Bonniers Förlag, Stockholm 1913, vol. 18, p. 212. 
3 E. O. Johannesson, op. cit., p. 66. 
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optimism. The Strindbergian individualist seems so advanced in 
self-awareness that he can actually justify himself in his chaotic 
irresponsibility and see in it a constructive and positive value. Let 
us stress this important observation: similarly to other great 
modernist individualists, he abides by some central value, even if 
it were the idea of being different from everybody else at any cost.  
 Now, can the same be said about Glahn and Nagel? I don’t 
think so. As we shall soon see, in their individuality there lurks 
something dark and frenetic, which does not lend itself to 
thematization on the part of their psyche. Their lives do not 
revolve around any idea or predominant value whatsoever. It is 
rather on the contrary: it is from life’s effervescence, its pure 
accidentality on the one hand, and its fateful necessity on the 
other, that the Hamsunian individualists derive their points of 
view, their values and incitements for action.  
 
3. „Man with no qualities”: Hamsun’s ambivalent invention 
In his lectures on Norwegian literature Hamsun promised to create 
“human types whose inconsistency is literally a fundamental trait 
of their character; this trait being not the only one dominant, but 
central and definitive”1. It should come as no surprise that if 
„inconsistency” is regarded as a „fundamental trait of character”, 
then the whole notion of “character” loses its sense. In Pan and 
Mysteries Hamsun intended to achieve this goal and indeed, there 
exists no other literary work in which a gesture of depriving the 
protagonist of a specified character would be performed with more 
consequence and severity. 
 Now, let us consider philosophically what it means to com-
pletely rid a human being of dominant features? Has this 
Hamsunian gesture been properly understood in all its con-
                                                 
1 „…menesker hos hvem inkonsekvensen bogstavelig er grund-
charaktertræk, men det eneste, ikke det hærskende grundcharaktertræk, 
men det meget fremtrædende og meget bestemmende” – K. Hamsun, Paa 
turnée, op. cit., p. 63.  
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sequences for the philosophy of a human being and for social 
practice? 
 Let us begin with a question: what is left of a human, when 
one eliminates from him/her everything that literature has along 
the centuries learned so finely to depict: one’s “character” and 
“personality” expressed in certain “typical” ways of thinking, in 
acknowledged rules, values and ideals? Most probably, what is 
left is bare life of instincts having nothing to do with rationality. 
What is left is a “man without qualities”1. In my view Hamsun was 
the first writer who long before Robert Musil’s novel bearing this 
very title (Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, 1930), and long before 
Albert Camus’ The Stranger (1942), whose main protagonist, 
Mersault, commits a murder just “because of the sun”, created 
characters which not only cannot be explained through a reference 
to a particular psychological or social theory, but are impossible to 
understand at all! Their behavior simply transgresses our modes of 
conceiving the world in which we can function rationally only as 
long as we are able to find reasons for given phenomena, 
including our own actions. 
 Still further I claim that the nature of Hamsun’s invention is 
far more ambivalent, not to say dangerous, than the Norwegian 
writer could have ever assumed. Let us remind that the idea 
guiding Hamsun in the creation of his protagonists was “that 
human characters in literature should resemble as much as 
possible, the characters of living people”2. Admittedly, this idea is 
nothing special in literature. It has probably accompanied every 
good writer in the history and even Hamsun, always ready to look 
down on other writers, must have known that. What Hamsun was 
                                                 
1 Sverre Lyngstad has already compared Nagel to “the man without 
qualities” but he did not elaborate on this idea – See: S. Lyngstad, Knut 
Hamsun, Novelist. A Critical Assessment, Peter Lang Publishing, New 
York, p. 33. 
2 „at literaturens mennesker skal ligne livets saa meget som muligt” – K. 
Hamsun, Paa turnée, op. cit., p. 63.  
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not aware of, however, was something that his Pan and Mysteries 
have brought to light: that Glahn and Nagel, conceived of as “men 
with no qualities”, do not at any rate resemble ordinary people, 
contrary to the opinion quite commonly shared by Hamsun’s 
critics1. According to my knowledge, there was only one critic, a 
very early one, who really thought throughout this fact: Hans 
Aanrud. However negative his opinion about Pan and Mysteries 
might have been, he came up with a very relevant idea about their 
protagonists: “Like Nagel in Mysteries, lieutenant Glahn is not a 
human being, but a cluster of spiritual and physical movements 
(…), which are not governed by any will, any aim, any measure – 
as in a madman; only with this difference, that the madman has his 
idées fixes. Lieutenant Glahn is neither normal, nor mad, shortly 
speaking – he is not a man”2.  
 This feature of Hamsun’s protagonists which Aanrud got so 
irritated with is the one most interesting for me. Let us follow this 
newly observed trace. Shortly after publishing Hunger Hamsun 
would claim that in his psychological inquiries he went “as far as 
                                                 
1  For example French expert and translator of Hamsun – Régis Boyer – 
claims: “We are all Augusts or Thomas Glahns. (…) The Hamsunian hero 
well fits the man of our time, with his doubts, his search for happiness, or 
more precisely, identity” – R. Boyer, Introduction [in:] K. Hamsun, 
Littérature à la mode et autres textes, traduit du norvégien, présenté et 
annoté par R. Boyer, Joseph K., Lonrai 1996, p. 23. In relation to 
Hamsun’s vision of the new psychological literature voiced in Paa turné, 
Nils M. Knutsen writes: “for literature to be realistic, it should deal with 
life as people factually live it” („at litteraturen skal være realistisk, den 
skal handle om livet slik menneskere faktisk lever det”) – N. M. Knutsen, 
Knut Hamsun, Aschehoug, Oslo 1975, p. 12. 
2 “Ligesom Nagel i Mysterier er Løitnant Glahn intet Menneske, men en 
Ophoben af sjælelige og fysiske bevægelser (…), hvor ingen vilje, ingen 
hensingt, intet maal styrer dem, altså hos en gal – dog med den forskjel, at 
en gal har fikse ideer. Løitnant Glahn er altsaa hverken normal eller gal, 
kort sagt intet menneske” – H. Aanrud, [no title], “Norske 
Intelligenssedler” 1894, nr 10, [no page], quoted by: Ø. Rottem, Hamsun 
og fantasiens triumf, op. cit., p. 92.  
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only a sane person may go”1. I think he did not know to what 
extent he was right! The existence of a “man without qualities” 
has nothing to do with an existence of an ordinary man, since it 
opens itself for dangerous forces gripping it from beyond, it 
entrusts itself to fate and accident only, which brings about both 
positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, such an 
existence must break with all the relations with the organized 
world of a human community, but on the other, it is capable of 
responding in the authentic way to the offer of the ever-evolving, 
effervescing life in all its tragic groundlessness.   
 I think that literature of modernism, however transgressive 
and innovative it might seem, has not been able to realize a vision 
of a human being as posited by Hamsun. To put it even more 
radically, I should state the following: not only has modernist 
literature been unable to fulfill the task set forth by Hamsun, it 
simply couldn’t have done so. It couldn’t, because it vaguely 
realized that to disconnect man from the ideals, values and socio-
cultural measures that organize and govern his behavior would 
mean to break up with the traditional social ethics conceived of as 
an elementary care for a single life and, more generally, for the 
well-being of the human community. 
 
4. Nietzsche/Hamsun: Culturogenic Perspective of „The Will 
to Power” and „The Eternal Return” vs. The Irrational Unity 
of Life 
Modernism has often emphasized the rampant individualism at 
odds with the social life, but still, underlying this special interest 
was the aim of grounding new values e.g. the idea of limitless 
auto-creation, elevation of a remarkable individual above the 
mediocre world, or ultimately – instauration of some counter-
                                                 
1 Letter to Bolette Oavels Larsen (no date), Oslo Universitets Bibliotek, 
quoted by: R. Ferguson,  Enigma. The Life of Knut Hamsun, Hutchison, 
London 1987, p. 118. 
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values. Contrary to this tendency, early Hamsun’s positing of 
accidentality, contradiction and disunion as the sole determinants 
of human behavior surpasses the horizon of modernity, trans-
gresses the cultural and embraces the inhuman dimension of life’s 
playful, innocent becoming “beyond good and evil”. In their 
indifference to their own fate Glahn and Nagel impersonate in a 
way life itself inasmuch as life cannot be endowed with 
responsibility for its acts and expected to turn with reactionary 
force against what time and fate have brought about.    
 Quite reasonably one is led to associate Hamsunian thought, 
as interpreted here, with the philosophy of Nietzsche, notably with 
his concepts of the “will to power” and “the eternal return”. In 
Gay Science, where the notion of the eternal return appears for the 
first time, Nietzsche asks the reader:  
 
What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you 
into your loneliest loneliness, and say to you: “This life as 
you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live 
once more and innumerable times more; and there will be 
nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every 
thought and sigh (…) will have to return to you gain to 
you, all in the same succession and sequence. The eternal 
hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and 
again be turned and you with it, speck of dust!” Would you 
not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse 
the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced 
a tremendous moment when you would have answered 
him: “you are a god and never have I heard anything more 
divine”?1 
 
The eternal return signifies the coming back of every moment ad 
infinitum, which constitutes a vision both joyful and abysmal at 
the same time. To pass with dignity the ordeal of the eternal return 
                                                 
1 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science [in:] The Nietzsche Reader, ed. by K.A 
Pearson and D. Large, Blackwell Publishing, New York 2006, p. 236. 
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is possible only for the ones who can say “yes” both to the 
moments of happiness and fulfillment in life and to those that 
bring suffering, shame or even self-destruction. To speak of Glahn 
and Nagel as incarnations of the Nietzschean Overman is only 
legitimate when we assume that what links these two characters is 
a desperate “courage to live their own moments to the limit”, as 
Stanislav Brzozowski – a prominent Polish literary critic of the 
late nineteenth century and an admirer of Hamsun – once put it1.  
Such a courage does not refrain even from the perspective of one’s 
own collapse and unexpected death. To have a “courage to live 
one’s own moments to the limit” means not to want to change 
anything in one’s life, to feel in every particular moment of 
becoming its inconditionality and necessity, that is, its highest 
value. It means living in a real unity with the world and giving 
one’s actions an absolute sanction. Whereas the ordinary man’s 
will remains always in a way imprisoned in the past – it regrets 
what happened and, realizing the impossibility of turning back the 
time, demands compensation or vengeance, Hamsun’s prota-
gonists might be said to fulfill the Nietzschean commandment: 
amor fati, which, according to the philosopher, expresses “the 
eternal joy of becoming – that joy which also encompasses joy in 
destruction”2.  
 There exists, however, a large difference between Hamsun’s 
heroes and the Nietzschean Overman, which points to a far-
reaching discrepancy between Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal 
return and the vision of a human being developed in Hamsun’s 
early novels. In the light of this difference Hamsun appears to be 
much less “Nietzschean”, and ipso facto still more original than it 
is commonly believed. 
                                                 
1 S. Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski. Studya o strukturze duszy 
kulturalnej, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 1983, p. 315. 
2 F. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, Penguin 
Books, New York 1968, p. 110. 
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In the clearly modernist spirit and in accordance with Nietzsche’s 
thought, early Hamsun links the human ego with unconscious 
psycho-biological forces which form its real ground. It is through 
an active reference to this ground that the human “I” is being 
constituted, and it is this ground that attributes man with the 
authenticity unmediated neither by work of reason, nor by patterns 
of social co-existence. 
 In his critique of post-Cartesian conception of the rational 
subject realized by way of vindicating irrational impulses that 
constitute an individual, Nietzsche, however, was occupied with 
yet another problem of crucial importance for his cultural thought, 
namely: how to ground ethics and induce universal values out of 
this newly glorified sphere of the irrational? Although it is 
possible to find in Nietzsche’s work fragments showing his 
fascination with pure frenzy of life and his urge to let go and 
perish in it ecstatically, it seems to me that the stakes of his work 
were set much higher: he wanted to synthesize the phenomena of 
rationalism and irrationalism, to connect that which is vital, 
biological, with that which is fully conscious, reflexive, and what 
would enable human’s cultural activity. 
 Nietzsche was perfectly aware of the hazardous temptation 
introduced by the perspective of the eternal return. If the world is 
to be seen as a giant pot, indifferently producing and dissipating 
forms of life, and if we are advised to say tragic “Yes” in the face 
of every single event it has arranged for us, then maybe the only 
thing worth doing is to embrace moments of ecstasy and sensual 
intoxication. As early as in The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche was 
being lured by a perspective of the experience of the limits, which 
he referred to as the “tragic” or “dionysian” experience, wherein 
the individual casts a challenge against the neurosis of death and, 
by way of glorious self-annihilation, willingly throws himself into 
the primordial chaos of becoming.  
 Now, it is essential to understand that it was not this hectic 
frenzy that Nietzsche had on his mind when he spoke of the 
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consequences of the “dionysian” insight. On the contrary, he 
meant to say that acknowledging life’s tragic indeterminacy 
should serve as a stimulus to create new values in the ever 
transient world of flux. That is why Nietzsche insisted that to gaze 
into the world’s abyss takes much courage, if not heroism. What is 
at issue here is particularly Nietzschean heroism of the Overman, 
who recognizes the tragic groundlessness and aimlessness of life, 
yet does not allow this tragic knowledge to devour him. On the 
contrary: the Overman uses it to reinforce his affirmation of every 
moment of his short yet intensive life: “Who sees the abyss but 
with the eyes of an eagle, who grasps the abyss with the talons of 
an eagle – that man has courage”1 – wrote Nietzsche in Thus spoke 
Zarathustra. Nietzsche’s intention was to make of the knowledge 
of the eternal return the complement of the will to power 
(understood as the will to life and creation) and not its 
contradiction as a motivation for an irresponsible flight towards 
auto-destruction.  
 Strong subjectivity, the one that the late Nietzsche was trying 
to reanimate, lies in an individual who consciously lives through 
his/her life, not letting himself be carried away towards an all to 
easy irresponsibility. It is an active and creative subjectivity 
which, naturally, is constituted by irrational drives and instincts, 
yet he is able to “keep them on the leash” and harness them to 
work for the sake of culturogenic goals, for building in this world 
new islands of sense. 
 That would be Nietzsche’s position the way I see it. Now, 
coming back to Glahn and Nagel, one is led to conclude that their 
peculiar submission to perilous forces of their psyche rids them of 
any concern with the fate of the world and with their own plight. 
What is more, it does not allow them to set for their existence any 
                                                 
1 F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra [in:] The Portable Nietzsche, 
selected and translated by W. Kaufmann, The Viking Press, New York 
1954, p. 400.  
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constructive aim, letting it be swept towards an imminent 
catastrophe.  
 Hamsun sees his protagonists as standing in the monstrous 
flux of unconscious, blind forces, but instead of equipping them 
with any form of stability or self-assuredness in the face of this 
monstrous influence – be it some rule by which they could abide 
in the moments of hesitation, be it the most basic instinct of self-
preservation, etc. – he only says: “do not refrain from anything” , 
“you are not accountable for anything you do”. This is a path to be 
followed only by those, who are not limited by any ethical ideas, 
be it “pity” for human beings, “human fraternity”, or even the 
ideals that Nietzsche was calling for: man as a “will to power” that 
wants to create new values and by the act of creation overcome 
nihilism and lay the normative fundaments for a new culture to 
come. 
 It could be argued, then, that contrary to Nietzsche’s thought, 
which, as it can be rightly argued, “does not avoid the eschatologic 
and perhaps even quasi-teleological dimension, and betrays a 
constructive bias clearly based on the moral ideal in its concern 
for the condition of the world and the establishment of a harmonic 
community”1, Hamsun’s thinking in Pan and Mysteries situates 
itself truly “beyond good and evil”, on the side of pure life, which 
in all its profound irrationality revokes faithfulness to any 
intellectually or culturally imposed ideals of itself and perpetually 
invents itself anew – ever becoming, accepting everything it 
comes across. 
 
                                                 
1 B. Banasiak, Integralna potworność. Filozofia libertynizmu, czyli 
konsekwencje “śmierci Boga”, Wyd. Thesaurus, Poznań 2006, p. 429. 
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5. Glahn and Nagel:  Tragic Dignity in the Face of Life’s 
Indeterminacy or an Inhuman Will of Nothingness? 
According to Anne G. Sabo Glahn and Nagel bear certain 
Nietzschean features, such as the rejection of Christianity, search 
for Dionizyan intoxication in the experience of a unity with the 
totality of being, saying „Yes” to every moment of life.  
 Sabo goes on to say that ultimately these protagonists suffer 
defeat. In Nagel the will to affirm the existing world turns out to 
be “incomplete”; in the end he takes his own life after  realizing 
that he cannot get with his mystical message across to the people. 
Likewise, Glahn’s feeling of unity with nature does not protect 
him from an urge to finish with himself: “He remains at the level 
of shattered individuation – disintegration – and thus he goes 
under without actually crossing over”1.  
 Some more “Nietzsche-oriented” commentators of Hamsun 
look upon the existence of these two heroes in terms of success 
and failure, assuming that it is their eventual self-inflicted death 
that proves their failure. Nettum, for instance, sees the reason for 
Nagel’s fall in his “uncompromising nature” (det kompromissløse 
ved Nagel)2 his incapability of conforming to the society’s 
requirements. According to Sabo, „If loneliness is his doom, that 
also indicates that his will is not as courageous as that of the 
Übermensch. Loneliness, or solitude, does not overpower 
Zarathustra”3. If we agree to see in Hamsun’s protagonists the 
characters shaped accordingly with the pattern of Nietzschean 
Overman, then it is indeed hard not to acknowledge their failure as 
individuals incapable of resisting the “will to nothingness” and 
directing their existence onto a path of sovereignty and pure 
affirmation of being. 
                                                 
1 A.G. Sabo, The Übermensch Comes to Scandinavia: Rereading 
Hamsun and Dinesen in the Light of Nietzsche’s Philosophy, University 
of Washington Press, Washington 2000, p. 343. 
2 R. N. Nettum, op. cit., p. 140.  
3 A. G. Sabo, op. cit., p. 342. 
 144 
But I would like to advance a different interpretation. I propose to 
take Nettum’s argument concerning the “inability to compromise”, 
add to it the opinion of Nils M. Knutsen according to which this is 
Glahn’s “pride” that refrains him from coming back to Edvarda 
and becomes a “cage” in which he is willingly locked and in 
which he will “eventually perish”1, and interpret them against 
themselves, that is, to the advantage of the Hamsunian prota-
gonists. Perhaps then this “uncompromising nature” (revealed 
most dramatically at the end of the two discussed novels when we 
see that Glahn prefers to die rather then go back to Edvarda who 
once again offers her love, that Nagel chooses to distance himself 
from those who carry about him and plunge in his crazy visions 
instead of fighting them in an attempt to save himself) would be a 
proof of the sublime (for Nietzsche both fascinating and 
terrifying) carelessness towards their life, their truly “higher 
morality”? Perhaps this “pride” we deal here with would mean 
being able to die for one’s irrational ego, accept death where it is 
the consequence of an arbitrary psychological impulse which 
cannot be explained by reference to any lucid reasons and 
motivations? 
 I claim that in early Hamsun we stand face to face with some 
kind of a dark morality; a morality fundamentally tragic in its 
acceptance of life’s chaotic maelstrom, a morality demanding that 
one never flees from any moment that it introduces to us. One of 
Nietzsche’s metaphors imagines a player who throws dice and 
never complains about the number shown, the dice being in fact 
thrown by the world which is also the world of our groundless 
psyche. Maybe this is so, that in every moment we live the full 
possibility of our lives. Each moment contains in itself the fullness 
of life. And maybe to have a courage to live through all one’s 
                                                 
1 „Tidligere har vi sett at Glahn på visse måter er lukket inne i seg selv og 
lukket inne i øyeblikkets rus. Nå kan vi se at han også er lukket inne i sin 
stolthet; - og stoltheten blir til et bur som han til sist omkommer i” – N. 
M. Knutsen, op. cit., p. 41. 
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moments, means solely to live freely? Acting spontaneously and 
impulsively, or, as I argued before, irresponsibly, Glahn and Nagel 
pay a great tribute to the ideal of not falsified life, the life that 
neither looks back at other people, nor does it care for itself, but 
presses ahead, ready to meet either its further development and 
intensification, or its disdain, derision and fall. 
 We cannot forget the other side of the “coin”, however. The 
Hamsunian man, driven only by external, unconscious forces, is 
virtually incapable of building anything steady and durable in his 
existence. Nor is he able to participate in creating a new world of 
values and meaningful deeds – this being the goal essential for 
Nietzsche. Thus it might be said that the Hamsunian vision of 
“man without qualities” – an individual capable of throwing 
himself into the dangerous effervescence of life – is marked by 
something wholly other to the ordinary human world, something 
monstrous… or maybe divine? If we agree to regard Hamsun as a 
great observer of the most subtle quiverings of the human psyche, 
if we see in his early heroes the dreamers characterized by “a 
poet’s responsiveness to things that more thick-skinned people do 
not notice”1 or romantic visionaries, who, like their creator, are 
able to “delve into scenery in all its being and make it appear in 
images which pulsate with life, with eroticism and with mood”2, 
then we should also acknowledge Brzozowski’s insightful remark 
that: “underneath these flights of fancy, absorbed in listening to 
the beauty of passing moments one can feel a tragic, resilient, 
terrifying force”3. This force makes of the Hamsunian protagonists 
characters in a way gruesome, inhuman. The creations of Glahn 
and Nagel incline one to as much of a romantic fascination, as an 
awe and pure horror. The greatness of the Norwegian writer, I 
                                                 
1 H.A. Larsen, op. cit., p. 46. 
2 N.M. Knutsen, B.E. Olsen, Hamsun’s Nordland, Forlaget 
Nordlandsbilder 1991, p. 22. 
3 S. Brzozowski, op. cit., p. 316. 
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believe, manifests itself in that he left his readers clueless in the 
face of this engrossing ambivalence.∗ 
 
 
                                                 
∗ This text is a part of the project: Knut Hamsun as a Critic and 
Successor of Modernity, realized with the support granted by Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway by means of co-financing from the European 
Economic Area Financial Mechanism and the Norwegian Financial 
Mechanism as part of the Scholarship and Training Fund. 
 
